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Summary
Objective: The objective of this study is to develop a
solution to preserve security and privacy in a healthcare
environment where health-sensitive information will be
accessed by many parties and stored in various dis-
tributed databases. The solution should maintain
anonymous medical records and it should be able to
link anonymous medical information in distributed
databases into a single patient medical record with the
patient identity.
Methods: In this paper we present a protocol that can
be used to authenticate and authorize patients to
healthcare services without providing the patient identi-
fication. Healthcare service can identify the patient
using separate temporary identities in each identifica-
tion session and medical records are linked to these
temporary identities. Temporary identities can be used
to enable record linkage and reverse track real patient
identity in critical medical situations.
Results: The proposed protocol provides main security
and privacy services such as user anonymity, message
privacy, message confidentiality, user authentication,
user authorization and message replay attacks. The
medical environment validates the patient at the
healthcare service as a real and registered patient for
the medical services. Using the proposed protocol, the
patient anonymous medical records at different health-
care services can be linked into one single report and it
is possible to securely reverse track anonymous patient
into the real identity.
Conclusion: The protocol protects the patient privacy
with a secure anonymous authentication to healthcare
services and medical record registries according to the
European and the UK legislations, where the patient
real identity is not disclosed with the distributed patient
medical records.
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1. Introduction
Electronic or mobile healthcare networks
are established by connecting information
systems used by general practitioners,
hospitals and national/private medical
centres. This approach is an attractive sol-
ution for the already overstretched and
under-budgeted health sector since it re-
duces the current paper-based work, de-
creases waiting time, eliminates prior ap-
pointment requirements, enhances health-
care services with efficient, faster and more
reliable methods, eliminates errors that can
happen in the paper records and speeds up
administrative procedures [1]. However, the
development of such a working model in
live medical environment will be subjected
to an increase in the amount of sensitive
medical information being transferred be-
tween different parties, with the data trans-
port taking place over the Internet or the mo-
bile network. The key problem with this is
the security and privacy of communication,
especially preserving the patient privacy by
preserving the integrity of the information
about the health condition and medications.
Our previous paper [2] proposed the neces-
sary security framework to prevent eaves-
dropping, spoofing and modifications to the
healthcare information over the network.
This paper proposes an approach to solve
the problem of patient privacy using a novel
anonymous access control technique.
Privacy as a social and legal issue has
been analysed in detail in the past [3]. Pri-
vacy can be understood as the right and de-
sire of a person to control the disclosure of
personal information [4]. This control can
be passed to a third party in exchange for
some services. A function of anonymity is a
sub-section of the privacy protection.
Anonymity protects user privacy by authen-
ticating the user without identification. For
example a patient who has registered with
the National Health Service (NHS) should
be able to receive healthcare advices from
any medical centre in the country without
disclosing his identity.
The UK parliamentary POSTnote on
data protection and medical research [5]
proposed to encrypt personal identifiers in
the electronic patient records using a code
key before using those patient records for
secondary use such as analysis, audit and
research.These anonymous medical records
consist of information about cancer regis-
tration, heart disease, HIV or drug surveil-
lance and there should be a methodology for
patients to request a report on their data.The
data linkage is a task of matching and com-
bining anonymous medical records that re-
lates to the same patient from one or more
organizations and creating a patient medical
history. There has been number of activities
carried out in data linkage as a major
requirement for healthcare data warehous-
ing. Kerkri et al. [6] presented a medical
data warehousing approach that aims to use
data semantics to regroup and link patient
medical data from different health infor-
mation systems. Christen discussed an over-
view of current privacy preserving data
linkage approaches and their limitations in
one of his research publications [7]. Quantin
et al. studied the effect of different pa-
rameters on the reliable linkage in order to
reduce the homonymous and synonymous
errors [8].
The demand for user anonymity has in-
creased with the expansion of electronic and
mobile healthcare systems. An unauthor-
ized access to a person’s health-sensitive
data can be subjected to different type of
misdemeanours. Some of the misdemean-
ours are as follows:
● The insurance companies are interested
to know the un-disclosed medical con-
ditions of their clients to increase the in-
surance premium.
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● The access to addiction or mental sensi-
tive health information of a patient will
affect badly on his potential employment
opportunities.
● Banks will be reluctant to approve loans
if they notice any serious health con-
ditions of the account holder.
Hence patients are reluctant to use online
healthcare services due to the possibility of
the misuse of the health-sensitive personal
data by third parties. In the past there have
been incidents where the patient medical in-
formation was disclosed to external parties
from various institutions such as healthcare
providers, blood banks, pharmacies and
adoption agencies [9, 10]. Some patients are
too embarrassed to meet a doctor or a gen-
eral practitioner face-to-face to discuss pri-
vate and sensitive healthcare issues. They
prefer to use a remote access system in
which their identity will not be disclosed
[11]. On the other hand, one of the problems
with this approach is the reluctance of the
doctors or physicians to give medications
without knowing that they are communicat-
ing with a real patient. Eysenbach et al. [12]
discussed the level of frustration of doctors
or physicians responding to unidentified
and unauthorized e-mails seeking medical
advices. Therefore in an anonymous medi-
cal situation, patients should have some
validation tokens to prove their legitimacy
to the healthcare service but it should not be
linked with their identity.
Therefore the anonymous access to
medical services is one of the key require-
ments in electronic and mobile healthcare
environments. This paper proposes com-
munication architecture for the medical
environment which enables access to medi-
cal services without revealing the patient
identity to the medical services or the third
party service providers. However, medical
environment validates the patient to the
healthcare service as a real and registered
patient for medical services. The patient
may get medications anonymously from
different medical services in the proposed
environment and all the anonymous medical
history can be linked as a single medical
report for the patient. Doctor or physician
has the capability to reverse track the patient
for further communication on anonymous
medical records without compromising the
real identity.
2. Related Work and Tech-
nology Requirements
The research on anonymous authentication
has been carried out by a number of research
groups worldwide. A group of researchers
from Tokai University, Japan, have pro-
posed an approach [13] to access services
based on user’s authority but without iden-
tifying the patient at the service provider.
This approach is based on attribute cer-
tificate issued by the Attribute Authority.
Leszczyna has presented two un-traceabil-
ity protocols for mobile agent environment
as a solution for anonymous access of IT
services and its applications to an e-health
counselling scenario [14]. Un-traceability is
a subset of anonymity since the identity
cannot be inferred by tracing the message.
Gritzalis et al. [3] discussed about the im-
portance of privacy and confidentiality in
electronic healthcare to the human psyche.
They used a real scenario implemented
through a well-established distributed elec-
tronic environment in Greece that has been
used for treating one beta-thalassemia pa-
tient for more than five years.
Splitting the personal identification from
the medical details and encrypting each part
separately is a methodology proposed to
protect privacy and confidentiality in dis-
ease registers. Kelman et al. [15] proposed a
secure protocol to link health data from un-
paralleled resources for the monitoring and
evaluation. There is a proposed anonymous
record linkage procedure using a one-way
hash coding based on a standard hash algo-
rithm [16].As an extension to this procedure
the same authors have introduced two large
random files of keys, called pads, to avoid
dictionary attacks on identification data
[17]. A number of methods for record link-
age have been presented and evaluated [7,
18-20]. Quantin et al. have done a compari-
son on statistical methods to provide data
anonymity against preserving data con-
fidentiality using encryption methods in
epidemiological environment [21]. A group
of researchers from Aalborg University,
Denmark, have proposed a solution to pro-
tect user-sensitive data with context-aware
privacy protection mechanism by filtering
the data before any disclosure in a medical
environment [22].
One of our previous papers [23] ad-
dresses authentication and privacy concern
in electronic healthcare environment and
ways to prevent it using the technologies
such as Web services, Generic Authenti-
cation Architecture from 3GPP and Uni-
versal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS). The system proposed in this paper
is based on the Single-Sign-On (SSO) and
XML security technologies. The SSO tech-
nology lets user authenticate to a single
authentication authority once and allows ac-
cessing all the authentication-protected re-
sources and services without re-authenti-
cation [24]. The protocol developed in this
study follows the SSO model based on Lib-
ertyAlliance standards and guidelines [25].
3. Proposed Architecture
A patient with a web browser/mobile device
connects to the healthcare service unit
(HSU) over the Internet/mobile network in
the proposed anonymously accessible medi-
cal environment. This HSU and medical en-
vironment is owned by a publicly trusted or-
ganisation for medical services. The health-
care service providers (HSP) such as private
medical centres and general practitioners
provide healthcare services to patients.
These services have to be registered using
an offline methodology with the HSU be-
fore providing any services. The HSU auth-
enticates and authorises patient for access-
ing service providers. The patient registers
with healthcare service providers before ac-
cessing any services and registration pro-
cess is performed through the HSU as
shown in Figure 1. Once the registration
process is completed the patient can access
services with a hidden identity to the health-
care service provider. However the patient
identity is disclosed to HSU for the patient
authentication into the environment. Based
on the identity and credentials the patient is
authenticated and authorized to access
healthcare service providers through HSU.
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However patient identification is not dis-
closed to the healthcare service providers.
The HSU acts as an anonymous identity
provider, user authenticator and service
access storage.
4. Protocol
The protocol presented in this paper pro-
vides an anonymous authentication for pa-
tients to access healthcare service providers.
Patients receive medications over the Inter-
net or mobile network without revealing
their true identity. The following conditions
must be satisfied prior to the use of the
protocol.
● Many healthcare service providers are
registered with the HSU.
● The HSU and healthcare service pro-
viders maintain an asymmetric key se-
cure communication channel between
them.
● Each HSP has more than one registered
patient through HSU for anonymous
access.
4.1 Patient Registration
with the HSP
The patient registers with the HSP using the
authentication at HSU. The sequences of ex-
changed messages (Fig. 1) are as follows:
● Patient to HSU; the patient makes a re-
quest to register for an anonymous ser-
vice access with healthcare service pro-
vider.
● HSU to patient; HSU generates and
sends the registration token and a tem-
porary session key (tsK). The temporary
session key is used for the secure com-
munication between the patient and the
healthcare service provider.
● HSU to HSP; the HSU sends the regis-
tration request token to HSP.
● Patient to HSP; the patient sends the
registration token with HSP offline/-
online service access information to
HSP. The service access information is
an option field in the message and it is
encrypted using the tsK.
● HSP to HSU; HSP sends the registration
confirmation message to the HSU if the
registration request token is validated
successfully with the patient registration
token. With the successful confirmation
HSU records the identity of the patient
with the healthcare service provider’s
identification.
4.2 Patient Authorization and
Anonymous Service Access
The patient authorises to access services
from HSP using the authorization provided
by HSU. The sequences of exchanged
messages (Fig. 2) are as follows:
● Patient to HSU; the patient requests to
access a healthcare service provider
anonymously by sending the healthcare
service provider’s identity.
● HSU to patient; the HSU generates a
temporary user identity for the patient
and it is a random number for each ser-
vice request. The temporary session key
(tsK) is generated by the HSU to estab-
lish a secure communication channel be-
tween the patient and the healthcare ser-
Fig. 1 Patient registration with HSP
Fig. 2 Patient authorization and anonymous service access
vice provider. The HSU sends the tsK,
key life time and user token to the pa-
tient. HSU records the user identity, tem-
porary user identity, service provider
identity and timestamp in its database.
● Patient to HSP; the patient sends the
user token as the login request to health-
care service provider. The patient will be
an anonymous user to the HSP since the
user token doesn’t have any parameters
to identify the true identity of the patient
but it confirms that patient is a registered
user at the HSP and he/she is authorized
to access services.
● HSP to patient; the healthcare service
provider validates user token and sends
the confirm authentication message to
the patient.
● Patient to HSP; patient sends the ser-
vice request message to healthcare ser-
vice provider and it is secured using the
tsK.
● HSP to patient; the healthcare service
provider responses to the message with
encrypting the response using the tsK.
The patient can send many service requests
to the same healthcare service providers
until the temporary session key is expired. If
it is expired or the patient wants to change
the healthcare service provider then patient
has to do a new service access request to the
HSU. Then the HSU will generate a new
temporary session key and temporary
identification for the patient.
5. Security Tokens
The following are tokens deployed in the
proposed schema and authors have reduced
sizes and complexity of tokens as much as
possible due to the processing power con-
strains of the mobile device and bandwidth
constrains in the mobile networks.
● RegistrationToken
(RT = eHSP (sHSU [UID|TS])); used by
the healthcare service provider to iden-
tify and authenticate legitimate patient
registration requests that are validated
from the HSU. It consists with the user
identification created by the HSU and
the timestamp. The registration token is
signed by the secret key of HSU and it is
encrypted using the service provider’s
public key.
● RegistrationRequestToken
(RRT = eHSP (sHSU [UID|TS|tsK|
KeyLifeTime])); used by the healthcare
service provider to identify legitimate
patient registration requests from HSU. It
consists with the user identification of
patient, temporary session key, key life
time and the timestamp. The Registra-
tionRequestToken is signed by the HSU
secret key and encrypted using the ser-
vice provider’s public key.
● UserToken
(UT = eHSP (sHSU [TUID|TS|tsK|
KeyLifeTime])); used by the healthcare
service provider to authorize anonymous
service access requests from patients. It
consists with temporary user identity,
timestamp and temporary session key
and key life time. The UserToken token
is signed by the HSU secrete key and
encrypted using the service provider’s
public key.
Following are the implementation of tokens
as XML objects. However these snapshots
are taken before the XML encryption and
XML signature are applied.
● RegistrationToken
<RegistrationToken>
<UID>String</UID>
<TimeStamp>Time
stamp</Time Stamp>
</RegistrationToken>
● RegistrationRequestToken
<RegistrationRequestToken>
<UID>String</UID>
<TimeStamp>Timestamp</
TimeStamp>
<TempSessionKey>Key</
TempSessionKey>
</RegistrationRequestToken>
● UserToken
<UserToken>
<TempUID>String</TempUID>
<TimeStamp>Timestamp</
TimeStamp>
<TempSessionKey>Key</
TempSessionKey>
<KeyLifeTime>Time</
KeyLifeTime>
</UserToken>
6. Risk Analysis
The above healthcare environment is pro-
posed as a solution to the privacy and secur-
ity threats in the electronic and mobile
healthcare environments. This section will
discuss the possible threats that exist in the
distributed healthcare environment and
show how the proposed protocol can protect
some of the possible security and privacy
issues.
6.1 User Anonymity
The patient identity is only known by the
healthcare service unit which is a trusted
organisation by all the users and healthcare
service providers. The healthcare service
unit authenticates and authorizes patients at
the healthcare service provider with a tem-
porary identification. The patient obtains
distinct temporary identification for each
service access request to the same health-
care service provider. The temporary identi-
fication is a random number and it doesn’t
have any relationship with the true identifi-
cation of the patient. There are no relation-
ships between temporary identifications
that belong to the same patient or those gen-
erated for the same healthcare service pro-
vider access. Therefore healthcare service
providers are unable to trace back the tem-
porary identity to the real identification of
the patient. So the patient identification is
not disclosed to healthcare service providers
and third parties who are interested to gather
health-sensitive information.
6.2 Message Privacy
The patient health-sensitive information
and the patient identification are not linked
to any parties in the proposed environment.
For example the patient identity is disclosed
to the healthcare service unit but it doesn’t
receive any patient health-sensitive infor-
mation. Meanwhile the healthcare service
providers have access to patient health-sen-
sitive information but they are unable to
trace the patient identity. Therefore the pa-
tient privacy is protected in the proposed
healthcare environment.
Methods Inf Med 3/2008
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6.3 Message Confidentiality
A secured confidential communication
channel is established between the health-
care service unit and the patient web
browser/mobile device based on the asym-
metric/symmetric encryption and the pa-
tient uses the secure channel for the au-
thentication with the healthcare service
unit.Therefore the patient authentication re-
quests and tokens are protected from eaves-
droppers. The communication between the
patient and healthcare service providers is
protected using the symmetric key encryp-
tion technology. Therefore the patient-sen-
sitive health records are protected from
eavesdroppers and the patient privacy is
protected.
6.4 User Authentication and
Authorization
Patient authenticates to the healthcare ser-
vice unit by providing his/her identification
details and password or relevant credentials.
Once the authentication process is suc-
cessful patient can request authorization to
healthcare service providers from the
healthcare service unit. The user token is
generated by healthcare service unit and
with the validity of the user token the health-
care service provider authorizes the patient
for healthcare services.
6.5 Replay Attacks
Tokens generated during the authentication
and authorization process consist of time-
stamps to prevent replay attacks. An eaves-
dropper could capture login request mes-
sage of a previous protocol between a pa-
tient and a healthcare service provider. The
attacker might later replay that message try-
ing to impersonate the patient to the health-
care service provider. This attack will not
succeed if the healthcare service provider
validates the timestamp of the requested
message. These tokens are integrity-pro-
tected and attackers are unable to alter the
timestamps before the attack.
6.6 Reverse Identity Track and
Record Linkage
The proposed system provides medication
without identifying the user due to the
anonymous identification by the healthcare
service unit. However healthcare service
provider maintains a temporary identity for
each patient request. This identification can
be used to uniquely identify the patient be-
tween the service provider and healthcare
service unit. The healthcare service unit
maintains mapping between the patient true
identity and the temporary identity but this
information is not revealed to external
bodies. The healthcare service providers
may want to contact patients after the medi-
cation due to some critical medical situ-
ations such as wrong diagnosis or un-
covered health risk by research. In these
circumstances the proposed system has the
capability of tracking the true identification
of the patient through healthcare service
unit. However healthcare service unit has
the complete privilege to make the reverse
track identification. If needed in the future,
they can request patient to re-access the
healthcare service provider with the same
temporary identity rather than disclosing
the patient identity to the healthcare service
provider. The same identity mapping func-
tionality at the healthcare service unit will
be used to link all anonymous medical his-
tories of a patient to a single medical report
for future medications.
7. Conclusion
This paper described a medical environment
that a patient can access without disclosing
his identity. There are several situations in
which the patient is very reluctant to ap-
proach the doctor or a medical expert for ad-
vice due to the sensitivity of the medical
condition. Also medical records consist of
highly sensitive data and it is vital to protect
the patient privacy against misdemeanours
activities. The anonymous access control
protocol defined in this paper will provide
the way forward for secure future online/
mobile healthcare systems including the
functionalities such as reliable record link-
ing and securely reverse tracking anony-
mous patients to the real identity.
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